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Mathematical Economics is closely related with Social Choice Theory. In this paper, an attempt has 
been made to show this relation by introducing utility functions, preference relations and Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem with easier mathematical calculations. The paper begins with some 
definitions which are easy but will be helpful to those who are new in this field. The preference 
relations will give idea in individual’s and social choices according to their budget. Economists 
want to create maximum utility in society and the paper indicates how the maximum utility can be 
obtained. Arrow’s theorem indicates that the aggregate of individuals’ preferences will not satisfy 
transitivity, indifference to irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship simultaneously so that one of 
the individuals becomes a dictator. The Combinatorial and Geometrical approach facilitate 
understanding of Arrow’s theorem in an elegant manner. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper is related to Welfare of Economics and Sociology, in particular Social Choice Theory. 
Here we have tried to give various aspects of economics and sociology in mathematical terms. The 
presentation here is essentially a review of other’s works, but we have tried to give the definitions 
and mathematical calculations more clearly, so that one may find the paper naive and simple. We 
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B →
hope that here the mathematicians will find the economics useful, and vice-versa. We have also 
included “Social Choice Theory” which is regarded as a part of Mathematical Economics.  
 
In section 2, we give some definitions, which are very simple, but will be very helpful for those who 
are new in this field. Preference relations and utility functions are included in section 3 which are 
based on Arrow (1959, 1963), Cassels (1981), Myerson (1996), Islam (1997, 2008) and Pahlaj 
(2002). Arrow’s impossibility theorem, its combinatorial and geometrical interpretation is given 
more clearly in section 4 which are based on Arrow (1963), Sen (1970), Barbera (1980), Cassels 
(1981), Islam (1997, 2008), Ubeda (2003), Geanokoplos (2005), Feldman , Serrano (2006) and  
Breton, Weymark  (2006) , Feldman  and  Serrano ( 2007,2008 ), Suzumuro (2007), Miller  (2009), 
Sato  (2009). 
 
2. A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON SETS, FUNCTIONS, VECTORS AND OPTIMIZATION 
 
A set is any well defined collection of objects. Let A and B be two sets .The Cartesian product A × B 
of A and B is the set of pair (x, y) where x∈A and y ∈ B. A function f from A to B is a rule which 
assigns to each x∈A, a unique element f(x) ∈B. A more formal definition is as follows:  
 
A function f : A→ B is a subset of A× B, such that  
i) if x ∈A , there is a set y∈B   such that  (x, y) ∈ f    ii) such an element  y is unique , that is , if  x 
∈A,  y, z∈B   such that ( x, y) ∈f, (x, z) ∈f  then y = z . 
If    is a function, then the image of A f : ( ) A f f , , is the subset of B defined as follows: 
() ()x x f A f {} A ∈ = / , that is,  ( ) ( x f A f  consists of elements of B of the form  , where x is 
some element of A. Here A is the domain and B is the co-domain.  A function f: A→ B    is surjective 
if each element of B is the image of some element of A. The function f is an injective if for all x, y∈ 
A, f(x) = f(y) implies x = y. The function is bijective if it is both injective and surjective.  
)
 
A correspondence φ  from a set A to a set B is a relation which associates with each element x of A a 
non-empty subset  () x φ   of B. Generally, if f is a function from a set A onto a set B then for every y 




− 1 − f
 
Let us consider the set of all n -tuples of real numbers which is denoted by R and is called n-
dimensional Euclidean space. A typical element or a vector in this space is denoted 
by , where  () n x ) x x ,..., , 2 1 = x ( n i xi ,..., 2 , 1 =  are real numbers. We will use the words ‘points’ 
and ‘vectors’ interchangeably; the point x can be associated with the directed line segment from the 
origin 0= (0,0,...,0) to the point x. A convex set is defined as follows: Consider a set C which is such 
that , if x and  are in C, so are all the vectors of the form tx + (1 – t)  x′ x′ with  , in other 
words, if the set C contains points x and 
1 ≤ t 0 ≤
x′, it also contains all the points lying in the straight line 
joining x and  . For example in  x′
2 R  the interior of a circle is convex, in
3 R  the interior of a sphere 
is convex, etc. Let us consider a function f(x) where ( ) n x x x ,..., , 2 1 = x , then by a hypersurface we 
mean the set of points in 
n R for which f(x)= constant. For different values of the constant, we find 
corresponding different hypersurfaces. For n = 3 we have different surfaces, on the other hand for n 
= 2 we have simply curves. The indifference hypersurfaces do not intersect each other in the finite 
region. Since all the components of the vectors are non-negative so we will deal here only with non-Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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negative coordinates. For n = 2 the curves lie in the first quadrant and for n = 3 the surfaces lie in the 
first octant.  
For a function f(x) to be optimum (maximum or minimum) () . 0 = ′ = x f
dx
df











 at  0 x x =  the function is 
minimum at a point . If  0 x x = ( ) y x f ,  be a function of two variables x and y  then for 











∂ ) , and . If 0
2 > − xy yy xx f f f ( ) 0    and   0 > > yy xx f f , then 
the function has a minimum point, if ( ) 0    and   0 < < yy xx f f  then the function has a maximum 
point. For  , there is neither a maximum nor a minimum, but a saddle point. In all 
cases, the tangent plane at the extremum (maximum, minimum or a saddle point) to the surface 
, is parallel to the z-plane. If  , one has to apply other considerations 
to determine the nature of the extremum. 
0
() y x,
() n x n y y y ,..., , 2 1 = y
n
2 < − xy yy xx f f f
f z = 0
2 = − xy yy xx f f f
 
3. UTILITY FUNCTION  
 
We consider vectors 





x y x y x ≠ ≥ ⇒ > but     , that is  is different from   for at least one i                 (1b)  i x i y
i x ⇒ >> y x  for all i                      (1c)  
 
Now we introduce the notion of preference (Arrow 1959, 1963, Islam 1997, Myerson 1996, Breton 
and  Weymark  2006 ,Feldman  and  Serrano 2007,2008 , Suzumuro 2007, Miller  2009, Sato  
2009). 
 Suppose two bundles of commodities are represented by the vectors x and y. The components 
represent amounts of different commodities in some unit, such as kilogram. We assume that one 
prefers the bundle x to the bundle y or he prefers y to x, or he is indifferent to the choice between x 
and y. We can write these possibilities, respectively, as follows: 
  xPy, yPx, xIy .          ( 2) 
 
Sometimes we use the notation  
               x Ry                                                             (3) 
to mean that either x is preferred to y or x is indifferent to y, so that y is not preferred to x. If xPy 
then it is not necessary that all the commodities of x are greater than all the corresponding 
components of y. We can write that it is not necessary that x >> y or even  .   y ≥
We now define the utility function (Islam, 1997, 2008) as,  
  .         ( 4 )   () ( n x x x u u ,..., , 2 1 x =
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 u (x) > u (y)   .         ( 5 )   xP ⇔
  
Let us consider a fixed vector  , and consider the set of all the vectors x which are preferred to . 
If we denote this set by  , we can write (Cassels, 1981) 
x
( x V
  .         ( 6 )   (){ 0 x x x x P V : =
For the utility function it can be written as,  
         ( 7 )   () ( ) ( { 0 : x x x x0 u u V > =
where V  is a convex set. 
 
We now introduce the idea of a budget constraint. For bundle x with a price vector p let us consider 
one has maximum c amount of taka or dollars to spend, then we can write, 
  ; (p  is the price of the bundle x)    (8)   c ≤ x p  .
which is referred to as budget constraint. Let us consider the hypersurfaces  
   u (x)   =   c o n s t a n t ,          ( 9 )  
for various values of the constant. According to (5) the individual concerned is indifferent to the 
bundles represented by all these vectors i.e., all these bundles for him are ‘equally good’ (or ‘equally 
bad’). That is why (9) are indifferent hypersurfaces. For simplicity we consider n = 2, so, 
  .          ( 1 0 )   () x u x =
The indifference curves are given by rectangular hyperbolae, 
           ( 1 1 )   x x 2 1
where, k = constant > 0. 
Let the fixed price vector  be   then by (8) the budget constraint is  ( 2 1, p p = p
          ( 1 2 )   x p x p ≤ + 2 2 1 1
with fixed c. 
If we draw a straight line (AB), 
          ( 1 3 )   x p x p = + 2 2 1 1
then there is only one member of family of indifference curves (11) that touches the straight line 
(13). Let it touch at the point ( 2 1,x x )  which is a vector and it maximizes the utility (see figure – 1).   
  
The inequality (12) restricts ( 2 1,x x )
()









= , which is parallel to the vector  p. 
The maximum of the utility function must occur on the line AB but not in the interior of triangle 




2 2 1 4 p p
c
x x x x ≡ = 1 .    (See Appendix – I)      (14) 
From (14), we get 
1 2 1
2
2 4 x p p
c
x =  and substituting in (13) yields, Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
 









whose discriminant is zero, so (13) has two common roots  2 1 x x =  and the curve and the line touch 
at a point ( . We will show maximality of indifference hypersurface in Appendix – I.  ) 2 1,x x
2 x
 





                       
            
              A 
   
                                             
                                           
                                     
                                            N             
                                         P                ( ) 2 1,x x  
 
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                    
                                           
                                       
                O                                                                          B                              1 x
                      Figure-1                                                                       
             Figure-1: The point (  maximizes the utility. ON is parallel to price vector p which                        
is perpendicular to AB. 
) 2 1,x x
n
 
In R  we consider a single indifference hypersurface, 
  ,          ( 1 5 )   () u = x 0 k
0 k
p  .
for some fixed  . For every price vector p>0, there is a particular vector x which minimizes the 
cost   for all the vectors x on this hypersurface. Since the vector depends on p we write it as  x
( p x ) p′ ′ ′ , for all x lying on (15). If there are two price vectors   and  and 
write
p
() ( p x x p x x = ′ ′ ′ = ′   ,   ) ′ ′  that is, the vectors x′  and x′ ′  minimize the total cost   
 respectively on the hypersurface (15), so that we have   x p . ′ ′ x p   and    . ′
x p x p x p x p ′ ′ ≥ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ≥ ′ ′ ′ .   .   and   .   . ′ ′  
  () ( ) 0 .   and   0 . ≤ ′ − ′ ′ ′ ′ ≤ ′ ′ − ′ ′ ⇒ x x p x x p .     ( 1 6 )  
Adding these two inequalities we get, 
  () ()   0 . ≤ ′ ′ − ′ ′ ′ − ′ ⇒ x x p p .       ( 1 7 )  Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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This is known as the substitution theorem. 
  Now let the two vectors p′ and p′ ′   differ only in their ith   components that is 
i, j ,     ,     ≠ ′ ′ = ′ ′ ′ ≠ ′ j j i i p p p p then 
  () ()   0 . ≤ ′ ′ − ′ ′ ′ − ′ ⇒ i i i i x x p p .
x . ′
                                                                                (18) 
Since p  minimized by  ()x p x ′ = ′   and  ( ) x p x ′ ′ = ′ ′    then    substituting  p i p p i ′ + ′ = ′ ′ δ  in (18) 
we get 
      () () () 0   -   ≤ ′ + ′ ′ ′ − i i i p p x p x p δ δ . 
Now   () ()       i
i
i
i i i i p
x
p p x p p x ′
∂
∂
′ = ′ + ′ δ δ  so that we can write (assuming  i p′ δ >0) 







.          ( 1 9 )  
















         ( 2 0 )  
where   i ≠ j. 
  To examine the significance of the Reciprocity theorem (20) we let n  =3 and 
consider  to refer to the three commodities tea, coffee and sugar respectively. For  i=1 , 


















         ( 2 1 )  
If the common value of (21) is positive, the function  increases with   and same as for   and 
. This can be explained as, if the price of tea goes up, we drink more coffee, and vice versa. In 
this case the commodities are said to be substitutes. 
1 x

















         ( 2 2 )  
If the common value is negative, so that the function   decrease as  increase and  decreases 
as   increases, the rate of decrease being the same, which we can interpret as saying that as the 
price of sugar goes up we drink less tea, and if the price of tea goes up we buy less sugar to 








Arrow’s original form of his theorem appeared in his book (1963). The form given here is based as 
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Weymark (2006), Sato (2009).  Arrow’s theorem deals with the manner in which the preferences of 
a group of individuals are combined to yield the preferences of a group. We can explain it by a 
simple example known as paradox of the voter. Suppose we have a community consisting of three 
individuals A, B and C. Assume that they have three alternatives x, y, z from which to choose. Let x, 
y, and z stands respectively for hot war, cold war or peace with another group of individuals. If A 
prefers x to y, and y to z then we write   
                                  e t c .       ( 2 3 )     A A Pz Py x
Here we omit indifference between two alternatives; that is for x and y we have   
.We assume that choices x, y and z are transitive, that is, 
yPx or      
 xPy and yPz  xPz.         ( 2 4 )  
For voter paradox, suppose the preference relation for A, B and C are as follows; 
           ( 2 5 a )   A APy x
           ( 2 5 b )   B BPz y
  .          ( 2 5 c )   C CPx z
Now we impose two conditions on the group preference of x, y, z as follows; 
i) it must be transitive 
ii) it should satisfy the majority rule, that is, if  out of three people two prefer x to y, then the 
group prefers x to y. 
Now we want to impose two conditions which are (i) the relation should be transitive and  (ii) 
the relation should satisfy the majority rule. From (25) we see that x is preferred to y by A and C, so 
that, by the majority rule, x is preferred to y by the group. Again, we see that y is preferred to z by A 
and B, again by the majority rule y is preferred to z by the group. Since we claim that the group 
choice be transitive, so that x will be preferred to z by the group. If we now require that the group 
choice be transitive, we deduce that x is preferred to z by the group. However, from (25 b, c) we see 
that in fact z is preferred to x by  B and C, so that by the majority rule z should be preferred to x. 
Thus we see that in the situation that the individual choice is given by (25a-c) it is not possible to 
impose the requirements of transitivity and majority rule simultaneously, although these conditions 
are fairly reasonable. 
 
The above problem expresses the fact that certain difficulties arise when we try to work out the 
preference of a group from those of the individuals in it, even when one wants reasonable 
requirements to be satisfied. Arrow’s theorem deals with such impossibility of finding group 
preference.              
 
We consider a finite set U of n individuals and we denote a typical individual by u  (i=1, 2,…, n ). 
In the above example n = 3 and a society U = {A, B, C}.We consider a finite set S consisting of ‘a’ 
alternatives or social choices which we denote by x, y, z,…. Every member of the set U has a 
preference ordering on the set S in the sense that if  S y x ∈ ,  we have one of the following three 




  .         ( 2 6 )     i i i i i x Px y Py x    ,    ,
For the individualu , we shall denote by   any given ordering of the set S. Similarly, we shall 
denote by W the preference ordering of the whole group U. If the individual u    prefers x to y we 
shall write, 
i wIndus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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() i w




  .          ( 2 7 )     i iPy x  
We now want to determine W if we are given   for all i. If all the individuals prefer x to y, then 
the group should prefer x to y, that is, 
i w
       for all i ⇒ x P y (W ).                            (28)  i iPy x
Arrow’s theorem is concerned with attempting to find a group or social ordering W from the 
individual orderings  , 
  .         ( 2 9 )   ( w w w W ,..., , 2 1
The followings are the conditions of the theorem; 
I) W is defined when each of the   runs independently through all orderings of the set S.  w
II) The condition (28) is satisfied. 
III) This condition is referred to as indifference to irrelevant alternatives and is given as follows: 
 
Let T be a subset of S. For each i, let  i w′ and i w′ ′   induce the same ordering on T. In this case, 
 and  () n w′ ) w w W ′ ′ ,..., , 2 1 ( n w w w W ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ,..., , 2 1  induces the same ordering on T. We denote these two 
conditions by W  respectively.  W ′ ′ ′,
 
The condition (III) may be slightly difficult. Let S={x, y, z}, and T={x, y}⊂ S. Consider the 
orderings of A, B, C given by  C B A C B A w w w w w w ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ , ,   and    , ,  which induce the same ordering on 
{x, y}. For example, this might be (Islam, 1997) 
  () ( A A A A A A w Py x w Py x ′ ′ ) ′    ,        ( 3 0 a )  
  () ( B B B B B B w Py x w Py x ′ ′ ) ′    ,        ( 3 0 b )  
  () ( C C C C C C w Px w Px y ) ′ ′ ′ y    , .        ( 3 0 c )  
In this case  ()( ) C B A C B A w w w W W w w w W W ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = ′ , ,     , , ,  induce the same ordering on x, y; that 
is, either 
   or () () W xPy W xPy ′ ′ ′   and    ( ) ( ) W Px W yPx ′ ′ ′ y   and    .    (31) 
Similar conditions hold if T is the subset {y, z} or {z, x}. 
We are now in a position to state Arrow’s Theorem; 
 
Arrow’s theorem: Suppose that S has at least three elements and the conditions I, II and III are 
satisfied. Then there exists an individual  U uk ∈ , such that 
      , some k,  ( n w w w w W = ,..., , 2 1 ) k n k ≤ ≤ 1     ( 3 2 )  
that is, the group preference coincides with that of some one (single) individual. 
 
4.2 A COMBINATORIAL APPROACH TO ARROW’S THEOREM 
 
Let us consider the sets U and S to have three elements each (Islam, 1997). As before we denote by 
x, y, z the group choices, and by  etc., the individual choices. Now there are six 
possibilities for the group preference ordering, as follows: 
A A A z y x , ,Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
 







           ( 3 3 a )   xPyPz
           ( 3 3 b )   xPzPy
           ( 3 3 c )   yPzPx
           ( 3 3 d )   yPxPz
           ( 3 3 e )   zPxPy
  .          ( 3 3 f )   zPyPx
Corresponding to (33 a-f), we have the individual preferences, six of each individual which we 
denote by   etc. The possibilities for the arguments of the 
function W are as follows; 
,... , , , , , , , 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 B A A A A A A w w w w w w w
  ( ) 6 ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 , ,    ;   , , = k j i w w w W
k j i C B A .       ( 3 4 )  
Thus there are 6
3=216 possibilities for the arguments of W, and there are six possible values (33a-f); 
so, the function W represents a map from a set consisting of 216 elements to a set consisting of six 








k C B A
j C B A
i C B A
W w w w W
W w w w W









       ( 3 5 )  
That is, the group preference coincides with one of the individual preferences, so that there has to be 
a ‘dictator’ if conditions I, II, III of Arrow’s theorem are to be satisfied. 
  Now we state briefly how Arrow’s theorem is to be considered in the combinational 
approach. In this case (34) can be introduced as follows; 
  ( ) a
} 6
.
C B A W w w w W
k j i = , ,         ( 3 6 )  
where   and i, j, k runs independently the values over the same set. The six values 
of ‘a’ give six possibilities (33a-f) for the group preference. 
{ ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 ∈ a
                    ∴ a = a(i, j, k) = a(i j k) .        
 (37) 
Arrow’s theorem implies that if conditions I, II, III are satisfied, this map must reduce to one of the 
following three  
  a (i j k) = i ;   a (i j k) = j ;  a (i j k) = k.       ( 3 8 )  
First we consider condition II for {x, y}; 
  .        ( 3 9 )   xPy Py x Py x Py x C C B B A A ⇒ , ,
We see from (33) that xPy obtains for  . If we denote the set of integers {1, 2, 5}, then  
  
5 2 1 , , W W W
{} ( ) {} 5 , 2 , 1 5 , 2 , 1 , , ∈ ⇒ ∈ ijk a k j i
Now we consider the condition III. Let ( ) ( ) k j i k j i ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ , , , , ,  be two possible set of values of the 
indices i, j, k and let T={x, y}.  Condition III asserts that if these two sets of values corresponds to 
the same ordering for x, y; then 
   must induce the same ordering on x, y. So that  ()( k j i a k j i a ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ , ,    and    , , ) ′ ′
∈ ′ ′ i     {1,  2,  5}  or  {3,  4,  6}       (40a)  ′ i ,Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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∈ ′ ′ j




    {1,  2,  5}  or  {3,  4,  6}       (40b)  ′ j ,
    or  {3,  4,  6}       (40c)  { , 2   , 1 , ∈ ′ ′ ′ k k
then, 
()( k j i a k j i a ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ , ,    and    , ,  are both from the set {1, 2, 5} or both from {3, 4, 6}. 
 
4.3 A GEOMETRICAL APPROACH TO THE COMBINATIONAL FORMALISM 
 
Here we introduce equations (33a-f) in the new notation: 
 0  :  xPy P z            ( 4 1 a )  
 1  : xPzPy           ( 4 1 b )  
 2  :  y P z P x         (41c) 
 3  :  yPx Pz           ( 4 1 d )  
 4  :  zPxPy           ( 4 1 e )  
 5  :  z P y   P x .          (41f) 
 
Thus (000), for example, gives the group decision or preference (41a) denoted by the integer 0. In 
this case, from the rules I, II and III, it is clear that (000) =0. There are   such possibilities, 
which can be grouped into 6 groups, for convenience, as follows, in notation which should be clear 
from the above remarks (Islam, 1997). 
216 =
 
The above six groups corresponds to A’s choice. In the first group A’s choice is uniformly ‘0’ in the 
second group A’s choice is ‘1’, and so on. 
A more symmetric way of representing these 216 values of the function a(i j k) in which choices of 
A, B, C are represented symmetrically, is through a cubic lattice in a three-dimensional Euclidean 
space containing   points. This is displayed in the figure-2.  216 6 6 6 = × ×
 
The points can be grouped into six lattice planes (each containing 36 points) which are parallel to 
the (i j) plane, to the (j k) plane, or to the (i k) plane. These correspond to the grouping according to 
C’s choice, to B’s choice and to A’s choice respectively.  
By Arrow’s theorem if A’s choice prevails then all the points on any one lattice plane parallel to the 
(j k) plane must have the same value, the value given by the i entry in (i j k), for B all the points in 
any lattice plane parallel to the (i k) plane has the same value, corresponding to the entry j in (i j k); 
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(000)         (001)          (002)           (003)         (004)           (005)         
(010)         (011)          (012)           (013)         (014)           (015)       
(020)         (021)          (022)           (023)         (024)           (025)        
(030)         (031)          (032)           (033)         (034)           (035)       
(040)         (041)          (042)           (043)         (044)           (045)        
(050)         (051)          (052)           (053)         (054)           (055) 
(100)         (101)          (102)           (103)         (104)           (105)          
(110)         (111)          (112)           (113)         (114)           (115)          
(120)         (121)          (122)           (123)         (124)           (125)                     
(130)         (131)          (132)           (133)          (134)          (135)     
(140)         (141)          (142)           (143)          (144)          (145)             
(150)         (151)          (152)           (153)          (154)          (155)       
(200)         (201)          (202)           (203)          (204)          (205) 
(210)         (211)          (212)           (213)          (214)          (215) 
(220)         (221)          (222)           (223)          (224)          (225) 
(230)         (231)          (232)           (233)          (234)          (235) 
(240)         (241)          (242)           (243)          (244)          (245) 
(250)         (251)          (252)           (253)          (254)          (255) 
(300)         (301)        (302)             (303)           (304)          (305) 
(310)         (311)        (312)             (313)           (314)          (315) 
(320)         (321)        (322)             (323)           (324)          (325) 
(330)         (331)        (332)             (333)           (334)          (335) 
(340)         (341)        (342)             (343)           (344)          (345) 
(350)         (351)        (352)             (353)           (354)          (355) 
(400)         (401)       (402)              (403)           (404)          (405) 
(410)         (411)        (412)             (413)           (414)          (415) 
(420)         (421)        (422)              (423)          (424)          (425) 
(430)         (431)        (432)              (433)          (434)          (435) 
(440)         (441)        (442)              (443)          (444)          (445) 
(450)         (451)        (452)              (453)          (454)          (455) 
(500)         (501)        (502)              (503)          (504)          (505) 
(510)         (511)        (512)              (513)          (514)          (515) 
(520)         (521)        (522)              (523)          (524)          (525) 
(530)        (531)         (532)              (533)          (534)          (535) 
(540)        (541)         (542)              (543)          (544)          (545) 
(550)        (551)         (552)              (553)          (554)          (555).       (42) 
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                                                                              Figure-2 
 
Figure-2: There are 216 points in the lattice cube where some of the points are displayed. The 
points are grouped into six lattice planes, each containing 36 points. 
 
We now explain how one can use the above formalism to give a ‘combinatorial’ proof of Arrow’s 
theorem for the particular case of three individuals and three choices. 
Let us consider the basic assumption:  
 ( 0   1   2 ) = 0 .          ( 4 3 )  
  
Here we are simply fixing on A as the dictator. If instead of (43) we had chosen (0 1 2) =1,2 we 
would have chosen B, C respectively as the possible dictator. 
Again we consider (0 1 0). From (41 a-f) we see that in this case all three individuals prefer x to y 
and prefer x to z. The value of (0 1 0), that is, the group preference must also reflect this. So that it is 
clear from (41a-f) that 
  .          ( 4 4 )   () 0 010 ∈{ } 1   ,Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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We now introduce an example in the support of condition III. Let us consider the choices (010), 
(012) and the subset {y, z}; then (010) and (012) are both in the set {0,2,3} or both in the set       
                        {1,4,5}.                                         (45) 
 
From (43) it follows that (012) is in the set {0,2,3} and so (010) must also be in this set. But from 
(44), (010) is also in the set {0,1}. The only common value between the sets {0,1} and {0, 2, 3} is 0, 
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Here  we  will  show  that  the  bundle  with  maximum  utility  must  lie  on  the  line                        
          ( A I - 1 )     x p x p = + 2 2 1 1
but not inside the triangle. For suppose one chooses the bundles x′ lying within the triangle, as is 
figure AI-1. If we join the origin to x′ ′  and continue the straight line until it makes the line (AI-1) at 
, then clearly  x′ ′




  , so   x ′ . 
 
Therefore, we can always find a bundle on the line (AI-1) whose utility is higher than any given 
bundle within the triangle. However, on the line there are many possible bundles (  each 
satisfying (AI-1); that is, each satisfying the budget constraint, 
) 2
          ( A I - 2 )   x p x p ≤ + 2 2 1 1
and which bundle should we choose to maximize his utility  
  .         ( A I - 3 )   () x x x x u = = 2 1 2 1,
Now we will show this by geometrically. We choose the bundle  ( ) 2 1,x x ′ ′ = ′ x  on (AI-1). Consider 
the indifference curve passing throughx′. Let this meet the line (AI-1) again at   (Figure AI-1). 
Choose any bundle   lying between 
x′ ′
x′ ˆ x′ and x′ ′   on the line (AI-1). Consider the indifference 
curve passing through   (dotted curve in Fig. AI-1). Here the utility of all the points on  2 ′ ˆ ˆ ˆ x x x 1 ′ = ′Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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x′ ˆ ′
0
this curve will be higher than k. Similarly if we chose a point between the points   and   whose 
utility will be higher. Clearly this process can be continued until we come to the point y at which on 
indifference curve is tangent to the line (AI-1). This point or bundle will clearly maximize the 




The same result can be obtained algebraically as follows: 











x f x p c x
p









x x p c
p dx
df



































x x y  is a maximum point on the line (AI-1) and hyperbolic  
curve (AI-3) but not inside the triangle. 
 
Let us now consider n=3. Here we will show that the maximum utility must lie on the plane. Let us 
consider the utility function  
          ( A I - 4 )   () 2 1 3 2 1 , , x x x x x u =
and the budget constraint; 
        ( A I - 5 )   x p x p x p ≤ + + 3 3 2 2 1 1
and the plane, 
        ( A I - 6 )   x p x p x p = + + 3 3 2 2 1 1




x p x p c
p
x − − =  and  () () 2 2 1 1
3
2 1
2 1, x p x p c
p
x x
x x f − − =  
() 0 2 2 2 1 1
3




0 2 2 2 1 1
    ⇒ = 0
1 x f  
         ( A I - 7 )   2 2 2 1 1 = − + ⇒ c x p x p
= − + c x p x p     ⇒ = 0
2 x f .       ( A I - 8 )    



























2 2 p p
c p
f x x − = , 
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x p x p c
p




























D x x  
So, the utility function is maximum on the plane and on the indifference hypersurface. 
 
Now the same result can be generalized algebraically as follows: 
 
Let us consider the parabola  ( ) 1
2 2 2










x f x a x
p
ab

















=   ab x
a





























y  is a maximum point on the parabola and 
hyperbolic curve (AI-3). 
.   












                                                                       x′ 
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                      x′ ˆ  
                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                        y
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                    x ˆ′ ′       
                                                                                                                                  x′ ′
                                                     
                                            O                                                                                
  
                                                     Figure-AI-1 
Now  b a x x u  = constant 

















b a − =  






1 = + − p a x a x . 
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x′ ′ x ˆ Figure-AI-1: The  -  and    - x′ x′ ˆ ′ ′  curves attain a maximum utility until they touch at the point 
‘y’ . So that maximum utility occur on the line but not in the interior of the triangle.                                                   
  












− ⇒ a x
a




1 = + − a x a x . 
2 a 1 3
2
x = ∴  is a double root. So, the parabola and hyperbolic curve are tangent only for 




a p =  and the maximum point lies on the parabola and hyperbolic 
curve (AI-3) but not inside the parabola. 
 
 
BY THE METHOD OF LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER  
 
Maximize  () ( ) n n x x x x x x u x f ... ,..., , 2 1 2 1 = = , 
subject to  () k x p x p x p x g n n = + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 .    (AI-9) 
Let us introduce Lagrangian multiplierλ , 
 
() () () () ( ). ... 2 2 1 1 2 1 c x p x p x p x x x c x g x f F n n n − + + + − = − − = L λ λ x  

































p x x x
p x x x










() ( ) p λ λ = = − n n n n p p p x x x x x x x x x , , , , , 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 L L L L .                 (AI-11)  
 
Consider the indifference hypersurface  c x x x n ′ = ... 2 1 .The normal to this at the point Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
 





( x x ,..., , 2 1  is given by  
() ( .   , , 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 − = ′ − ∇ n n n n x x x x x x x x x c x x L L L L    
 
According to (AI-11) this vector is proportional to p, which is normal to the plane (AI-9). Thus the 
normal to the indifference hypersurface is parallel to the normal to the plane. This is consistent with 
the plane being tangent to the hypersurface. 
Maximize,   
a a x x Ax u L
2 1
2 1 = () () 1 1 1 1
1
9 AI − − − − − = ⇒ − n n
n
n x p x p c
p
x L  
() ( )







n p x p x p c x x Ax x x f ÷ − − − = ∴ − − − −
−
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1




                                                
1
1 1 1 1 1

















































x p x p c x










                                                                                                                                       i=1, 2,…,n-1. 
 
By (AI-10) we get, 
() 0 1 1 1 1 = − − − − − − i i n n n i x p a x p x p c a L ,   i =1, 2, …,n-1.                        (AI-12) 
For n = 3 we have i =1, 2 then (AI-12) becomes 
() ( ) 0       and     0 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 = − − − = − − − x p a x p x p c a x p a x p x p c a         (AI-13) 




2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1
1












= = ⇒ .  
For n = 5, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 we get from (AI-12) 
()
() .   0 ...
...                       ...                    ...       
0 ...
4 4 5 4 4 1 1 4
1 1 5 4 4 1 1 1
= − − − −
= − − − −
x p a x p x p c a
x p a x p x p c a
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c′ =
 

































= ′ − ∇  
Thus, the plane being tangent to the hypersurface. Therefore, that in every case has the same result. 
 
Special case: 1 
 
Let us consider the parabola, 
  ( )
2 2 2 4 x a b y − =         ( A I - 1 4 )  





y k xy = ⇒ =         ( A I - 1 5 )  
  .  4 4
2 3 2 = + − k x b x a
 
Let coincident roots occur at  α = x  
  ( )( )
() ( ) [] .   2 2 4
4 4 4
2 2 2 3 2
2 2 2 3 2
βα αβ α α β
α β
− + + + − =
− − = + −
x x x a
x x a k x b x a
 
 






























= = ⇒ α  
Again we have, 
a 3
b







y = = . 

























x y k xy . 






= = − − ∇ 1 ,
3
8
1 , 8 4
2 2 2 2 ab
x a x a b y . 
So parabola and hyperbolic-curve are tangents i.e. maximum utility occurs on the parabola but not 
inside. 
 
Special Case 2:     
 
Let us consider the parabola and hyperbolic- curve Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
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c +
0
bx ax y + =
2  and x y = k, 
  . 
2 3 = − + + k cx bx ax
Let coincident roots occur at α = x  
() ()
() () [] .   2 2
2 2 2 3
2 2 3
βα αβ α α β
α β
− + + + − =
− − = − + +
x a x a x a
x x a k cx bx ax
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3 3 2 9 2
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ac b ac b abc b
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2 b b ac
x
y − + −
= . 








⎛ − + −




2 ac b b
x y k xy α . 








⎛ − + −





2 ac b b
b ax c bx ax y . 







Here we prove the reciprocity theorem (20). We first write down the conditions for the minimization 




∂ = u , these 
conditions can be written as, 





λ x p ] ,  i = 1, 2, …, n     (AII-1) 
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() x   i i u p λ =    i =1, 2, …, n.      (AII-2) 
By (16) and (AII-2) constitute (n+1) equations for the n +1 unknowns  λ , ,... , 2 n x x 1 x . 
( The solution for this set of equations for x is what we have denoted by  ) p x
p i p +
. Consider now a small 
variation in the price vector given by dp, that is each component   changes to . Let the 
corresponding change in 
i i dp
x be denoted by  x d , that is, the vector which minimizes (p+dp).x subject 
to (16) is  x d
0
x + .  
  .        (AII-3)  ∑ = = i idx u du
By (AII-2) we can write 
  0 = ∑ i i x d p .         (AII-4) 
Let P denote the total minimum price vector p subject to (16), that is, 
  () p x p. = P .         (AII-5) 
Taking the differentiation we get 
  () ( ) p p x p x p x p P d d d d . . . = + = .      (AII-6) 










i dp  for some function Q of p. So that we can write  
 
i
j
p
x
∂
∂
j
i
p
x
=
∂
∂
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